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Abstract. Recent literature has considered the form of loan contract between
two or more risk neutral parties where the revelation principle is inappropriate due to
the lack of commitment to an auditing policy by the lender. The privately informed
debtor has a stochastic return; once he knows the state realisation, auditing and
cheating are determined as Nash equilibria. The literature assumes that this leads
to randomised cheating and auditing. In this paper we verify that the contract may
involve this randomisation; but that it may also involve truthtelling with random
auditing and one or more investors in line with Persons (1996); or a single state inde-
pendent repayment with no auditing. We de¯ne conditions on the state observation
cost and the distribution of returns which determine which of these three forms of
contract is optimal. We ¯nd that under unlimited liability when the loan size is ¯xed
the two investor truthtelling contract dominates all the other forms; and that this is
also true when the loan size is optimally chosen. On the other hand under limited
liability if the cost of observation is large relative to the lowest state revenue, the
random auditing contract or a constrained two investor truthtelling contract may
be optimal. The limited liability condition in the constrained truthtelling contracts
forces the level of ¯nance to be higher than under unlimited liability.
Keywords: loan contracts, costly state veri¯cation, commitment, limited liability.
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1. Introduction
Consider a risk neutral agent - an entrepreneur or a consumer - who wishes to borrow funds
to ¯nance a project or consumption from alternative competitive risk neutral lenders.
Borrower income varies with states of nature and the loan(s) size; but once realised, the
state remains private information to the borrower, who makes an income report to the
lenders. In a scenario in which the prospective borrower has private information about
their income at repayment and where it is common knowledge that income at that time
may be insu±cient to repay a fair (safe) return on the debt, then no loan could be made
since the borrower would always cheat o®ering low repayments; and the lenders would be
unable to get the fair return on their loan. However the costly state veri¯cation approach
lets any lender undertake a costly audit at repayment stage in order to discover the true
income of the borrower. The contract stipulates a loan size and feasible repayments
in each state to each lender 1 which can be conditioned on the report of the borrower
and/or the act of auditing (Townsend, 1979, 1989; Gale-Hellwig, 1985, 1989, Hellwig
2001; Mookherjee and Png, 1989). Sometimes the contract will respect limited liability
on lenders so that all repayments in all states must be non-negative; but in other scenarios
if lenders have unlimited liability repayments can be negative.
The simplest case of the above scenario would be a two period model; in the ¯rst
period the loan contract is signed and in the second period repayments according to the
contract are carried out. However, unless there is an external enforcement device to make
the lenders perform the necessary auditing, generally the second best optimal contract will
not result in truthtelling (Hart, 1995; Khalil, 1998; Choe, 1998) since the auditing required
is not credible. In other words, there is a commitment problem for the lender in that if
the contract is written to give a loan size and repayments that ensure truthful reports
by the borrower at repayment, then since the lenders know that there is honest borrower
behaviour, there is no incentive for them to undertake costly policing of the borrower.
1That is, the borrower must have su±cient resources to cover the relevant repayment.Truth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts4
If commitment were possible (ie monitoring were contractible and enforceable) or there
were some means of making monitoring compulsory the optimal repayment contract would
minimise the incentive for the borrower to cheat by making the returns in di®erent states
of second period borrower income as close together as possible. In particular, in a two
state world this would mean taking all the resources of the borrower in the low state and
leaving them all of the surplus in the high state after satisfying the lenders participation
constraints.
To cope with the commitment problem, there are two ways in which the optimal
contract can be formulated. First, it could still impose truthtelling but require that
the repayments are structured so that the lender has an incentive to carry out costly
policing su±ciently often to stop the borrower from cheating. In other words, a sequential
rationality constraint could be imposed on the contract to give credible lender auditing at a
level which will induce truthtelling by the borrower (Jost, 1996, Krasa-Villamil, 2000).This
requires random policing by the lender, and a premium repayment to the lender when
he polices that just covers the observation cost. Hence whenever the borrower tries to
cheat, the lender is indi®erent between policing or not and can randomise the monitoring
decision. The probability of monitoring must be su±ciently high to deter the borrower
from ever trying to cheat. The cost of this policy is that sometimes in the low state the
borrower is left with some surplus (when he tries to cheat and is not monitored) although
in the low state when monitored he can be left with a zero surplus.
The second approach is to allow for a contract that leads to an "equilibrium" amount
of cheating by the borrower. That is, cheating and auditing could both be determined
expost as Nash equilibria in simultaneous play mixed strategies, as in Khalil and Parigi
(1998 - hereafter KP - who show that this has underinvestment relative to the ¯rst best
but claim that it has overinvestment relative to the second best with the loan size being
used as a way of motivating the lender to audit). More speci¯cally, equilibrium is taken to
mean that the probability of being monitored when trying to cheat and the probability ofTruth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts5
cheating are selected by the lender and borrower respectively to be mutual best responses,
so that formally there is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies in cheating and monitoring
between the lender and borrower. In this case it is possible to leave the borrower with zero
rent whenever he tries to cheat since the lender gets his fair return out of the punishment
repayments he can impose whenever the borrower cheats and is detected by monitoring.
In this type of setup Persons (1996) - hereafter P - considers a ¯xed loan size and allows
for the possibility of more than a single lender. He makes various feasibility assumptions,
the most important of which for our purposes are that the low state borrower income
exceeds the observation cost of the lender and that all prospective lenders have limited
liability so that any repayments that they receive must be non-negative. In addition to
this he assumes that each party to the contract faces an initial ¯xed cost just of writing
the contract and that monitoring is only sometimes successful in yielding any information
about the true circumstances of the borrower (that is, there is a ¯xed probability q that
the monitoring succeeds). Under these assumptions he shows that for di®erent required
investment levels and contract writing costs, any of three possible contract forms can be
optimal: a truthtelling contract with two investors, a truthtelling contract with a single
investor, and a single investor contract with no truthtelling but with a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium, as in KP. As we shall see it is crucial to his results that there are ¯xed
contract writing costs per person. We call the truthtelling contracts "hybrid" contracts
for reasons seen below (see section ?), and label them H1 and H2 for the two cases of one
and two lenders respectively; while we label the mixed strategy contract KP.
Within this framework, we show that:
(1) the two approaches to managing the commitment problem (either imposing a
sequential rationality constraint in the contract problem, or allowing cheating/auditing
to be determined as mutual best responses in the second period) lead to the same optimal
contract when that contract has truthtelling.
(2) If the loan size is ¯xed exogenously and there is unlimited liability, Persons as-Truth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts6
sumption on the contract writing costs is instrumental in setting the alternative forms
for the optimal contract. If the ¯xed cost on each party of writing the contract is zero,
a truthtelling contract with two investors, H2, always dominates the two other contract
forms, H1 and KP. The intuition for this result is that the only reason that the single
investor truthtelling contract is less e±cient than the second best is that it has to leave
some surplus to the borrower who cheats but is not monitored, in order to be able to make
the premium repayment to cover the observation cost which just gives enough incentives
to monitor. If it were possible to leave the borrower with zero surplus in the low state
whether or not he is monitored then the truthtelling contract would be equivalent to the
second best commitment contract. But with two investors and unlimited liability then
since repayments can be negative, the passive investor can e®ectively pay the observation
cost which then allows us to leave zero rent to the borrower in the low state whether he is
monitored or not. It also follows that with a zero contract writing cost or a per contract
rather than per person cost, the two investor truthtelling hybrid achieves the second best
when the loan size is ¯xed and dominates the other contract forms. If the contract writing
cost is not per capita but per contract so that there is a common ¯xed contract writing
cost to a two or three party contract then again this result holds. More generally one
might expect the contract writing cost to vary with the role of the lender-the monitoring
lender has more complicated arrangements to make eg ¯xing the audit procedures and
ensuring the result of the audit is public. It is perhaps more natural to expect that ¯xed
contract cost is higher for the monitoring than passive investor. If so then we show that
the two investor contract also dominates so long as the ¯xed cost on the passive investor
is not too high.
(3) With limited liability and a ¯xed loan size the two investor truthtelling contract
H2 is also dominant so long as low state revenues exceed the observation cost corrected
for the success rate of monitoring. However if the observation cost is higher than this
and there is limited liability then neither of the truthtelling contracts are feasible. Of theTruth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts7
three contracts in this case we are left just with the KP contract.
(4) We let the loan size vary; for example an entrepreneurial loan can be used to ¯nance
a technology in which the incomes in each state may plausibly vary with the loan size; a
consumer loan may be used to ¯nance real or portfolio investments in which case again
the revenues arising from the loan in each state will vary with loan size. A prime example
might be education loans. In this context, we reformulate the optimal contract problems
and show that with unlimited liability H2 still dominates the other forms of contract.
However with limited liability in order for a truthtelling hybrid contract to be feasible,
the loan size may have to be constrained to ensure that low state revenues are su±ciently
high in relation to the e®ective observation cost. The constrained version of H2 (where
the optimal loan size is set equal to the value that will equate low state income to the
observation cost corrected for the success rate of monitoring) may be better or worse than
the KP contract, depending on di®erent parameter values. We include a simulation that
shows that the constrained H2 can dominate KP when the loans size is optimally chosen.
Moreover we show that that all the contracts considered have under¯nance relative to the
¯rst best, but by means of an example, show that the two investor truthtelling contract
may have more ¯nance than the Khalil-Parigi contract.
(5) We brie°y consider the renegotiability of these contracts and show that if it is the
lender who makes any o®er after the borrower knows their type but before determination
of reporting and auditing strategies, then the contracts will tend to be renegotiation proof.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 contains our working assumptions; section
3 lays out the second period's game setup; section 4 characterises the optimal forms of con-
tract when the level of investment is ¯xed and compares their levels of repayment; section
5 considers the contract when investment is optimally chosen and section 6 concludes.
2. Assumptions
An investment project requires initial ¯nance in the ¯rst period and yields subsequent
risky revenues in the second period. The ¯nance required may either take the form ofTruth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts8
a ¯xed cost (e.g. a set up cost or entry fee), or the amount of ¯nance may in°uence
the quality of the project in the sense that returns are higher in every state with greater
¯nance. The risk neutral borrower can choose to secure the ¯nance from either one or
two risk neutral lenders (we will see there is no gain to be had from having more than two
lenders). There are only two states s in the second period: revenues can be high (s = H
and revenue is yH(B) where B is the total amount of ¯nance) or can be low (s = L and
revenues are yL(B)): The high state occurs with probability p: The realised state in the
second period is private information to the borrower, but one possible investor can audit
the state of the borrower by paying a ¯xed cost of Á: Following realisation of the state the
borrower makes a public report of the state to lenders. The audit technology is imperfect:
with probability q an audit reveals the true state but with probability 1 ¡ q it reveals no
additional information. The result of any audit and the fact that there has been an audit
are public knowledge so if there are two lenders, it is ine±cient to have more than one
of them monitoring, the second lender has no monitoring role and is purely passive. The
borrower has no additional outside resources and has limited liability so that repayments
to investor(s) are made out of the realised revenues and in each state cannot exceed the
revenues in that state.
Finance is organised through a contract: in period 1 the contract speci¯es B and the
repayments to investor(s) conditional on the information available at the repayment stage.
We take the contract to be written by the borrower-this has some advantages-Choe. The
available information is the report of the ¯rm and the result of any audit. If low state
revenues are su±cient to pay a fair return to investor(s), there is no incentive problem,
otherwise to ensure investors do receive a fair return, repayments must vary by state
being higher when the ¯rm has declared a high state. It follows that high state reports
will never be audited, if the state is low the borrower will truthfully declare it. But if
the true state is high the borrower may have an incentive to cheat and falsely report low.
Hence we can de¯ne the repayments as: RH;PH to the monitoring investor and the pureTruth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts9
investor respectively following a high state report of the borrower; RL;PL following a low
state report that is not successfully monitored (either not monitored or monitored but
monitoring fails); RLL;PLL following a low state report that is successfully monitored and
is found to be truthful and RHL;PHL following a low state report which is successfully
monitored and where the borrower is discovered to have cheated in their report.
If the project has only a ¯xed cost then incentive problems only arise if the ¯xed
cost exceeds the low state revenue, otherwise it would be possible to set Rs + Ps =
(1 + r)B for all s and avoid any incentive to cheat or need to monitor whilst giving
investors a fair return.. We call a contract with repayments that are independent of state
a Single Repayment Contract (SRC): We assume this is impossible: when revenues are
independent of B, yL < (1 + r)B where r is the safe interest rate. In this case it follows
that the investors must include the monitor if the project is to go ahead- otherwise the
borrower would just cheat for sure and the investor would not get back a fair return.
If the project has revenues that vary with B it is possible (by choosing B suitably in the
contract) to avoid incentive problems if there is a value of B such that yL(B) ¸ (1+r)B;
we allow for this possibility so in this case a SRC may be optimal. Again if the optimal
loan size involves yL(B) < (1 + r)B then the investor(s) must include the monitor.
Since monitoring is not contractible, either the contract itself must give the monitoring
investor the incentive to monitor so that the probability of audit is speci¯ed in the contract
and the repayments in the contract are set to pay a premium to the monitoring investor
to give them the incentive to audit, or the monitor must get the incentive to audit from
the di®erences between RHL;RL;RLL i.e. from the premium repayment that they get by
catching and punishing a cheating borrower. In this case the monitoring probability is
determined outside the contract and is a matter of choice for the monitor after the state
has been realised. Here after the borrower knows their state, cheating and monitoring
probabilities are selected as mutual best responses in a noncooperative game.
The time line is thus either :Truth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts10
t = 1 : - Contract signed including setting m the probability of audit
t = 2 : - State realised and observed by borrower
- The borrower chooses a report of the state which is public
- If the report is low the monitor randomly audits with the contracted m
- Repayments are made
or:
t = 1 : - Contract signed including setting only repayments and loan size
t = 2 : - State realised and observed by borrower
- The high state borrower and monitor simultaneously choose a probability of
reporting low l and of monitoring a low report m respectively.
- Following the report and the result of any monitoring repayments are made
The investors may have limited or unlimited liability: that is with limited liability
investors cannot be called upon to provide additional ¯nance to the borrower at repay-
ment stage and so Rs;Ps ¸ 0 for all s: But with unlimited liability repayments in some
contingencies may be negative. We thus have essentially four cases to consider: that in
which investors have limited or unlimited liability for a project that either involves a ¯xed
¯nancial requirement or in which the ¯nancial requirement is a variable which is endoge-
nously determined. In each case we have to consider whether it is better to use one or
two investors, and to write the level of monitoring into the contract with a monitoring
implementation constraint or to leave monitoring and cheating to be determined as a
simultaneous Nash equilibrium at the start of the second period.
We make some technical assumptions as follows.Truth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts11
2.1. Technical Assumptions. On the project we have alternative assumptions de-
pending on whether revenues are ¯nance dependent:
(A.1) when revenues are independent of the level of ¯nance (@ys=@B ´ 0), yL <
(1 + r)B < yH and pyH + (1 ¡ p)yL ¡ (1 + r)B ¡ Á=q > 0
(A.2) when revenues vary with the level of ¯nance








L(B) < 0;8B (A.2.1)
yL(B1) < (1 + r)B1 where py
0
H(B1) + (1 ¡ p)y
0
L(B1) = 1 + r (A 2.2)
ys(0) = 0;y
0




s(B) < 1 + r (A 2.3)
If yL(BSR) = (1 + r)BSR and py
0
H(B1) + (1 ¡ p)y
0
L(B1) = 1 + r (A 2.4)
then B1 > BSR:
pyH(B) + (1 ¡ p)yL(B) ¡ (1 + r)B ¡ Á=q > 0 for B ¸ BSR (A 2.5)
If yL(BL) = Á then BL < B1 (1)
(A.1) says that when revenues are independent of the loan size, the fair return on the
investment is attainable from the project even after observation costs have been paid, but
that low state revenues alone are insu±cient to achieve this.
(A.2.1) says that revenues in each state are positive and increasing but strictly concave
in the loan size, revenues in the high state are higher for any given loan size than in the
low state and that the high state is more productive in the sense that at any loan size the
marginal productivity of additional investment is higher in the high than the low state.
However the marginal productivity falls faster in the high state. An example that satis¯es
this is ys(B) = asf(B) where aH > aL and f(B) is increasing and strictly concave. (A.2.2)Truth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts12
says that at the ¯rst best loan size B1 which maximises Eys(B) ¡ (1 + r)B; low state
revenues are insu±cient to give a fair return on the loan so that a state-independent
repayment system cannot achieve the ¯rst best; this is related to (A2.4) which says that
the highest loan size which can repay the fair return with state independent repayments
is below the ¯rst best loan size. Note that since (A2.4) holds at BSR it implies that
p(yH(BSR) ¡ yL(BSR)) ¡ Á=q > 0 and so for all B > BSR also
p(yH(B) ¡ yL(B)) ¡ Á=q > 0 (2)
(A2.3) limits the marginal productivities in each state in relation to the interest rate
and also says that zero ¯nance yields zero revenue. Under this assumption there will be
su±ciently low values of B which will allow a SRC. Finally (A 2.5) says that for every
loan size above the level which will just generate revenue equal to the fair return in the
low state, the project is socially desirable in that the expected revenues exceed the fair
cost net of the observation cost. (A 2.6) says that the level of ¯nance which generates just
su±cient low state revenue to cover the observation cost is below the ¯rst best level. If
this condition failed then as we shall see, under limited liability, the truthtelling contracts
would automatically have overinvestment compared with the ¯rs best.
Fig 1 indicates some of these properties.
Putting all this together it is helpful to write the expected returns of the various
parties. For the borrower the expected return is
EU = p[yH(B) ¡ (1 ¡ l)(RH + PH) ¡ lmq(RHL + PHL) ¡ l(1 ¡ mq)l(RL + PL)](3)
+(1 ¡ p)[yL ¡ mq(RLL + PLL) ¡ (1 ¡ mq)(RL + PL)]
For the monitoring investor who supplies say a share ® of the ¯nance
E¦1 = p[(1 ¡ l)RH + lfmqRHL + (1 ¡ mq)RL ¡ mÁg] (4)








Figure 1: Technological assumptions
and for the pure investor who provides a share 1 ¡ ® of the ¯nance
E¦2 = p[(1 ¡ l)PH + lfmqPHL + (1 ¡ mq)PLg] (5)
+(1 ¡ p)[mqPLL + (1 ¡ mq)PL ¡ (1 ¡ ®)(1 + r)B
3. Setting the Monitoring Strategy in the Contract
3.1. Compulsory Monitoring. We know that without commitment the second best
truthtelling contract will generally be unachievable. The monitoring investor knows that
the contract induces truthful reports, so faced with a low state report they will be unwilling
to incur the monitoring costs. The borrower knows this and so if this contract were signed,
the borrower would just cheat for sure whenever the high state occurred. Nevertheless
the second best contract provides a benchmark against which to judge the alternatives.
If monitoring is contractible and enforceable then a level of auditing that yields
truthtelling can be written into the contract and this level will subsequently be enforced
without having to give any interim incentive to the monitor. Using truthtelling (l = 0) in
the payo®s of each party the contract problem with a single investor and a ¯xed investment
level isTruth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts14
max
m;RHL;RH;RL;RLL
p(yH ¡ RH) + (1 ¡ p)[yL ¡ (1 ¡ qm)RL ¡ mqRLL] (6)
s.t.
RH ￿ mqRHL + (1 ¡ mq)RL (7)
(1 + r)B ￿ pRH + (1 ¡ p)[(1 ¡ mq)RL + mq(RLL ¡ Á)] (8)
yH ¡ RH > 0;yH ¡ RHL > 0;yL ¡ RL > 0;yL ¡ RLL > 0 (9)
For a given loan size the solution to this problem has maximum punishment and zero rent
to the borrower: RHL = yH;yL = RLL = RL; a binding truthtelling constraint so that
mq = (RH ¡ yL)=(yH ¡ yL) and then RH is set to satisfy the participation constraint of
the lender. Using these in the borrowers payo®, the contract yields a maximal value to
the borrower of2
p(yH ¡ RH) = Eys(B) ¡ (1 + r)B ¡
(1 ¡ p)(Á=q)[(1 + r)B ¡ yL]
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q
(10)
With two investors it is very similar:
max
m;RHL;RH;RL;RLL
p(yH ¡ RH ¡ PH) + (1 ¡ p)[yL ¡ (1 ¡ mq)(RL + PL) ¡ mq(RLL + PLL)]
(11)
s.t.
RH + PH ￿ mq(RHL + PHL) + (1 ¡ mq)(RL + PL) (12)
®(1 + r)B ￿ pRH + (1 ¡ p)[(1 ¡ mq)RL + mq(RLL ¡ Á)] (13)
(1 ¡ ®)(1 + r)B ￿ pPH + (1 ¡ p)[(1 ¡ mq)PL + mqPLL] (14)
2Details of proofs are in the appendixTruth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts15
yH ¡ RH > 0;yH ¡ RHL > 0;yL ¡ RL > 0;yL ¡ RLL > 0 (15)
In fact if we combine the participation constraints of the two investors we have the single
investor contract again so that RHL + PHL = yH;yL = RLL + PLL = RL + PL; a
binding truthtelling constraint so that mq = (RH + PH ¡ yL)=(yH ¡ yL): There is an
interplay between ® and the division of repayments between the two investors to satisfy
each investors participation constraint. But the maximal payo® to the borrower is identical
to that with one investor, so on incentive grounds there is no gain in having diversi¯ed
investors when the monitoring strategy can be costlessly enforced.
3.2. Contracted Monitoring with a Sequential Rationality Constraint. With-
out commitment to monitoring the contract can still be designed to elicit truthful reports
and ensure that the monitoring is carried out but it needs a monitoring implementation
constraint. If the monitoring investor knows that the contract elicits truthful reports
he will only be prepared to monitor a low state report if the expected repayment he
gets qRLL + (1 ¡ q)RL exceeds the repayment he would get from not monitoring RL
by at least the observation cost Á: Hence the relevant sequential rationality constraint is
RLL ¸ RL + Á=q; this must be added to the contract problem. However here we face a
potential problem if low state revenues are low. Suppose that either the chosen B or the
¯xed ¯nance requirement yields low state revenues below the e®ective observation cost:
yL < Á=q: To ensure that RLL ¸ RL+Á=q then requires RLL > RL+yL: But the borrower
always has limited liability so that if there is a single investor (which must be the monitor)
RL;RLL ￿ yL and hence we must have RL < 0 if there is just a single investor. So long
as the single investor has unlimited liability this is possible, but with limited liability it
fails. A way out of the problem might be to add a second investor (see Persons): the
implementation constraint would be the same but the limited liability constraint of the
borrower would become RL + PL;RLL + PLL ￿ yL: If the second investor had unlimited
liability we could set PLL = PL ¡Á=q;RLL = RL +Á=q and PLL +RLL = PL +RL = yL:Truth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts16
Then PLL = yL ¡ Á=q ¡ RL < 0 and the role of the passive investor is then to "¯nance"
the monitoring costs.: This is only possible if the second investor has unlimited liability;
if they have limited liability then with either one or two investors the feasible set to the
contract problem is empty if yL < Á=q: With the project only requiring ¯nance to cover a
¯xed cost this means that there cannot be a truthful reporting contract with monitoring
determined at the contract writing stage. On the other hand if revenues vary with the
loan size, it means that the contract must constrain the loan size so that yL(B) ¸ Á=q:
4. Determining the Monitoring Strategy Outside the Contract
The alternative to setting the monitoring strategy at the contractual stage is to allow it to
be chosen by the monitoring investor as a best response to the report of the ¯rm. Here we
are in the scenario in which l and m are determined as mutual best responses. Recalling
the time line, the cheating-auditing game is played after the contracted repayments have
been agreed. Thus the optimal contract will have repayments that maximise the borrowers
expected gain within the investor(s) participation constraints and the constraint that the
probabilities of cheating and auditing will assume Nash equilibrium values that vary with
the repayments. It follows that if the game has alternative forms of Nash equilibria for
di®erent repayments then the optimal contract will select repayments that lead to a Pareto
e±cient Nash equilibrium-otherwise the investor(s) can still be held to their reservation
levels but the gain to the borrower increased. For the analysis of the second period Nash
equilibrium whether the loan size is endogenous or not is immaterial so we ¯rst analyse
second period behaviour picking out e±cient Nash equilibria.
4.1. The Second Period Game. Given the loan size and repayments, in period 2
income is realised and the debtor chooses an income report. The debtor will always make
truthful reports of low income to the active lender (since RH+PH > RL+PL;RLL+PLL)
but with high income the debtor may make a false low income report to the monitoring
lender with probability l. In period 2 this lender chooses the probability m with whichTruth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts17
to monitor any low income report by the debtor. This lender's best response m to a low
income report maximises his expected pro¯t conditional on the low state report:
E¼1jb L = plm[q(RHL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ q)(RL ¡ Á)] + (1 ¡ p + pl)(1 ¡ m)RL (16)
+(1 ¡ p)m[q(RLL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ q)(RL ¡ Á)] ¡ ®(1 + r)B
Depending on the sign of @E¼1=@m the best response is either a pure strategy (m = 0
if @E¼1jb L=@m < 0;m = 1 if @E¼1jb L=@m > 0) or a mixed strategy 0 < m < 1 (if
@E¼1jb L=@m = 0):
On the other hand the borrower's best reporting strategy l maximises his expected
utility:
EU = p(1 ¡ l)(yH ¡ RH ¡ PH) + plm[q(yH ¡ RHL ¡ PHL) + (1 ¡ q)(yH ¡ RL ¡ PL)]
(17)
+pl(1 ¡ m)(yH ¡ RL ¡ PL) + (1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ m)(yL ¡ RL ¡ PL)
+(1 ¡ p)m[q(yL ¡ RLL ¡ PLL) + (1 ¡ q)(yL ¡ RL ¡ PL)]
(here with two investors; with a single investor we have the same expression but Ps = 0
for all s) and again depending on the sign of @EU=@l the best response is either a pure
strategy (l = 0;l = 1) or a mixed strategy 0 < l < 1:
For di®erent repayments and loan sizes the Nash equilibrium may be a pure strategy
equilibrium, a mixed strategy equilibrium or a hybrid equilibrium in which just one of the
game players randomises.
Since the sum of the expected payo®s E¼1 + E¼2 + EU is equal to the di®erence
between Esys(B) ¡ (1 + r)B and the expected observation cost © = (1 ¡ p + pl)mÁ in
the equilibrium, an optimal contract will set the repayments and loan size to maximise
Esys(B)¡(1+r)B¡©: So we can select repayments that lead to e±cient Nash equilibria
by comparing the expected observation costs in the Nash equilibrium.
When B is ¯xed the optimal contract must either lead to a mixed strategy equilibrium
or to the hybrid equilibrium l = 0;0 < m < 1: The details are in the appendix; the tableTruth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts18
below shows the expected observation costs in di®erent forms of Nash equilibrium. In
each row the precise values of m:l di®er but we can establish relations between them
which give the results of the ¯nal column. Some of the solutions are infeasible as they
involve the borrower always repaying RL+PL which is insu±cient to meet the investor(s)
participation constraints. Others are feasible but are ine±cient since they involve higher
© than a feasible alternative.
©
l = 1;m = 0 0 infeasible
l = 1;m = 1 Á ine±cient
l = 0;m = 0 0 not best responses
l = 0;m = 1 (1 ¡ p)Á ine±cient
l = 0;0 < m < 1 (1 ¡ p)mÁ possibly e±cient
l = 1;0 < m < 1 mÁ ine±cient
m = 0;0 < l < 1 0 infeasible
m = 1;0 < l < 1 (1 ¡ p + pl)Á ine±cient
0 < m < 1;0 < l < 1 (1 ¡ p + pl)mÁ possibly e±cient
Table 1: Properties of Alternative Nash Equilibria
Looking at the Nash equilibrium values of m; in the truthtelling hybrid cases which
may be e±cient
m =
RH + PH ¡ RL ¡ PL
q(RHL + PHL ¡ RL ¡ PL)
(18)






When revenues are ¯nance dependent, an optimal contract will include choice of B.
Moreover contracts with di®erent levels of ¯nance and repayments will induce di®erent
types of Nash equilibria. In particular by setting the loan size su±ciently low the subse-
quent pure strategy equilibrium l = 1;m = 0 (the single repayment contract) can arise:
Nevertheless we can still deduce:
Proposition 1. The optimal contract must lead to a Nash equilibrium which is one ofTruth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts19
pooling l = 1;m = 0), interior mixed strategy (0 < l < 1;0 < m < 1) or the particular
hybrid case (0 < m < 1;l = 0) with either one or more investors (see appendix A.1).
The emphasis is on minimising monitoring costs whilst preserving incentives for the
borrower to tell the truth. If observation costs are very high, monitoring fails as a control
mechanism and it is best just to let the borrower cheat. For intermediate observation
costs the chance of cheating can be held down to below unity. For lower observation costs
it is possible to randomly monitor just enough to prevent the borrower cheating at all.
4.2. The Optimal Repayments Given B. We start with assumptions (A.1) where
revenues are independent of the level of ¯nance. The optimal contract problem conditional




s:t: E¼ ¸ 0
l;m are Nash equilibria
where EU and E¼ = E¼1 + E¼2 are given by (3),(4),(5) and s = H;L;HL;LL. Here
(following Persons), we have combined the participation constraints of the two investors-if
there are two- so that the relative investment shares ® disappear. For our purposes this
is enough since with risk neutrality of lenders the distribution of debt is unimportant
although if we were to consider a two investor misrepresentation contract the shares of
investment would matter (see Menichini-Simmons). The ¯rst constraint will always bind:
the optimal contract for a given form of the subsequent game equilibrium must always
give a zero expected return to the lenders. Otherwise it would be possible to reduce the
repayments to one of the investors in all states and preserve the lenders participation
constraint.
The KP Contract: A Single Investor. If the second period Nash equilibrium
is in mixed strategies then the borrower is indi®erent between truthfully reporting theTruth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts20
high state and cheating whilst the monitoring lender is indi®erent between accepting or
auditing a low state report. Using these indi®erence conditions in the payo®s of the
borrower and monitoring lender, the contract problem is to choose Rs to maximise
p[yH ¡ RH] + (1 ¡ p)yL ¡ mq(RLL + PLL) ¡ (1 ¡ mq)(RL + PL)]
st
p[(1 ¡ l)RH + lRL] + (1 ¡ p)RL ¸ (1 + r)B
ys ¸ RS (21)
l =
(1 ¡ p)(Á + RL ¡ RLL)





The optimal repayments and strategies are (see appendix A.1 or Khalil-Parigi, 1998):
RKP
L = yL (23)
RKP
LL = yL (24)
RKP
HL = yH (25)
RKP
H =
(1 + r)B(yH ¡ yL ¡ Á=q) ¡ yL(yH ¡ yL)(1 ¡ p)
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ Á=q
(26)
mKP =
[(1 + r)B ¡ yL][yH ¡ yL ¡ Á=q]




p(yH ¡ yL ¡ Á=q)
(28)
The borrower receives zero surplus in the low state whether or not he is audited.
There is maximum punishment for detected cheating. The incentive to audit does not
come from a premium RLL > RL but from the rewards from catching a borrower whoTruth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts21
cheats-these are set to make the monitoring lender just indi®erent between monitoring
or not. A high state borrower who truthfully reports receives some surplus. Cheating
increases with Á but falls with q and the spread of repayments yH ¡ yL; monitoring rises
with Á=q and with the loan size but for given yL falls with the spread of repayments. It is
surprising that monitoring increases with Á=q; we will ¯nd this repeatedly and interpret
it as arising from the requirements of a mixed strategy equilibrium in which one parties'
indi®erence condition determines the Nash equilibrium strategy of the other party ie
higher Á=q requires a higher level of monitoring to make the borrower indi®erent between
cheating and truthfully reporting.
In order for the mixed strategy to be a possible form of Nash equilibrium we must
have
yL < (1 + r)B and p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ Á=q > 0 (29)
to ensure that 0 < l;m < 1: Both these are assured by (A.1).
The H1 Contract: Truthtelling with a Single Investor. On the other hand if
the subsequent Nash equilibrium is the hybrid with l = 0 and one investor and either if
the investor has unlimited liability or if yL > Á=q; the optimal contract problem will then
have the form: choose Rs to maximise
p[yH ¡ RH] + (1 ¡ p)[yL ¡ mqRLL ¡ (1 ¡ mq)RL]
subject to:
pRH + (1 ¡ p)[mqRLL + (1 ¡ mq)RL ¡ mÁ] ¸ (1 + r)B
RH ￿ mqRHL + (1 ¡ mq))RL (30)Truth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts22
RLL ¸ RL + Á=q (31)
Rs ￿ ys (32)
where mq = (RH ¡ RL)=(RHL ¡ RL):
The optimal repayments and strategies are (see appendix A.1):
RH1
HL = yH (33)
RH1
L = yL ¡ Á=q (34)
RH1
LL = yL (35)
RH1
H =
[(1 + r)B ¡ q(yL ¡ Á)]
p(yH ¡ yL + Á=q)
yH (36)
+
[Esys ¡ (1 + r)B ¡ f1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q]
p(yH ¡ yL + Á=q)
q(yL ¡ Á) (37)
mH1 =
(1 + r)B ¡ (yL ¡ Á=q)
p(yH ¡ yL + Á=q)
(38)
Again there is maximum punishment for detected false low state reports ( this is never
actually paid in this contract) and the low income borrower who reports truthfully and
is audited receives zero rent. However the low type who is not audited retains some
surplus, this is necessary to give the monitor the incentive to audit su±ciently often to
stop cheating (so that qRLL+(1¡q)RL¡Á = RL). The monitor is just indi®erent between
auditing a low state report or not. The idea of the contract is that there is just su±cient
monitoring to ensure truthtelling and the monitor is willing to perform this because of
the premium that he gets (RLL > RL): Notice that RH1
L < 0 if yL < Á=q - this is feasible
if the investor has unlimited liability so in these circumstances the lender may optimally
make a transfer to the borrower. Again monitoring rises with the loan size.
But if yL < Á=q and the investor has limited liability this solution is infeasible. Then
we have to add the constraints Rs ¸ 0 to the contract. The constraint set is then empty:Truth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts23
combining (31) and low state feasibility yL ¸ RLL ¸ RL + Á=q > RL + yL which would
imply RL < 0: Hence under limited liability and yL < Á=q there is no single lender
contract which will generate truthtelling as part of a Nash equilibrium.
The H2 Contract: Truthtelling with Two Investors. Finally if the subsequent
Nash equilibrium is the hybrid with l = 0 and two investors and again either there is
unlimited liability on investors or yL > Á=q; the optimal contract problem is to choose
Rs;Ps to maximise
p[yH ¡ RH ¡ PH] + (1 ¡ p)[yL ¡ mq(RLL + PLL) ¡ (1 ¡ mq)(RL + PL)]
subject to:
p(RH + PH) + (1 ¡ p)[mq(RLL + PLL) + (1 ¡ mq)(RL + PL) ¡ mÁ] ¸ (1 + r)B
RH + PH ￿ mq(RHL + PHL) + (1 ¡ mq)(RL + PL) (39)
RLL ¸ RL + Á=q (40)
PS + Rs ￿ ys;s = H;L;LL;HL (41)
where mq = (RH + PH ¡ RL ¡ PL)=(RHL + PHL ¡ RL ¡ PL):


















(1 + r)B ¡ yL
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q
yH +
Esys ¡ (1 + r)B
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q
yL (44)
mH2 =
(1 + r)B ¡ yL
q[p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q]
(45)
We still have maximum punishment (which is never paid) for false low state reports
and the low type of borrower gets zero surplus whether or not he is audited. The monitor
receives a premium if he audits a low state report (paid by the passive investor) which
just covers the e®ective monitoring cost. The borrower receives a zero rent in all states
that actually occur except if he truthfully reports a high state. Monitoring rises with loan
size and with Á; falls with the spread of repayments and with q: Note that if yL < Á=q we
have RL + PLL = yL ¡ Á=q so at least one of RL;PLL must be negative.
Again it then follows that if the investors have limited liability and yL < Á=q there
is no feasible contract with two investors which yields truthtelling. So long as investors
have limited liability this is also true with any number of investors3.
Maximum Utility Functions. De¯ning EUSR(B) = Esys(B)¡(1+r)B; replacing
the optimal repayments for each contract in the debtor's expected utility and rearranging
we obtain:
EUKP(B) = EUSR(B) ¡
(1 ¡ p)(Á=q)[(1 + r)B ¡ yL]
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ Á=q
(46)
EUH1(B) = EUSR(B) ¡
(1 ¡ p)(Á=q)[(1 + r)B ¡ yL + Á=q]
p(yH ¡ yL + Á=q)
(47)
EUH2(B) = EUSR(B) ¡
(1 ¡ p)(Á=q)[(1 + r)B ¡ yL]
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q
(48)
3At ¯rst glance one might think that even if low state income is below the observation cost, we can
still get a zero surplus multiple lender and truthtelling outcome by having say n passive lenders with
each of them paying a share 1=n of the observation cost. However this will not work since if each passive
lender gets PLL;PL respectively, we need
RLL + nPLL = RL + nPL; RLL ¸ RL + Á; Rs;Ps ¸ 0: If we again set RL = 0 and RLL = Á we are
back to the condition that low state income must be above the observation cost to ensure PLL ¸ 0:Truth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts25
Welfare Comparisons under Fixed B. We can derive our ¯rst main result using
expressions (47),(65),(48). Firstly contrast the H2 contract with the H1 contract. These
are both well de¯ned under (A.1) either when yL > Á=q or when investors have unlimited
liability. We have:
EUH1 ¡ EUH2 =
(1 ¡ p)(Á=q)[(1 + r)B ¡ yL]
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q
¡
(1 ¡ p)(Á=q)[(1 + r)B ¡ yL + Á=q]
p(yH ¡ yL + Á=q)
(49)
= ¡
(Á=q)2(1 ¡ p)(Ey ¡ (1 + r)B ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q)
(p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)(Á=q))p(yH ¡ yL + Á=q)
(50)
Under (A.1) this is always negative, so the two investor contract with truthtelling always
dominates the single investor contract with truthtelling (irrespective of whether there is
limited liability or not). However if yL < Á=q and investors have limited liability neither
of these contracts is well de¯ned.
On the other hand:
EUH2 ¡ EUKP =
(1 ¡ p)(Á=q)[(1 + r)B ¡ yL]
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q
¡
(1 ¡ p)(Á=q)[(1 + r)B ¡ yL]
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ Á=q
(51)
= (Á=q)(1 ¡ p)[(1 + r)B ¡ yL]
p(Á=q)
[p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ Á=q][p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q]
(52)
Here again under (A.1) both denominator and numerator are positive so we have EUH2 >
EUKP whenever the H2 contract is well de¯ned (ie when either yL > Á=q or when the
investors have unlimited liability.
If the hybrid forms of contract are not well de¯ned ( if yL < Á=q and there is limited
liability on investors) we can only have the KP form.
Thus we have the result:
Proposition 2. For any ¯xed value of the loan size B that satis¯es p(yH¡yL) > Á=q and
yL > Á=q the two investor truthtelling contract, H2; dominates both the single person
truthtelling contract, H1; and the contract which leads to a Nash equilibrium level of
cheating, KP. For any ¯xed value of the loan size B that satis¯es p(yH ¡ yL) > Á=q and
yL < Á=q the KP contract is the only feasible form under limited liability.Truth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts26
From this result it follows that the relative merits of the H1 and KP contracts are
of little interest-both are dominated by H2 when the hybrid truthtelling contracts are
feasible. This is of interest since Persons ¯nds that there are cases in which either the H1
or the KP contract can dominate the H2 contract. We come back to this in the section
on extensions below; essentially it arises because he uses a ¯xed cost per agent of writing
a contract so that cet par a two investor contract is more costly than a single investor
contract.
5. Sequentially Rational Contracts or Games?
So far when revenues are independent of the amount of ¯nance we have examined the
optimal repayments and outcomes if the audit policy together with the borrowers cheating
policy is determined after the contract setting repayments has been signed and after the
borrower has discovered its type in a Nash equilibrium. In this section we show that in the
hybrid truthtelling cases these noncooperative solutions are identical to those that would
emerge if the audit policy were set together with the repayments within the contract. In
this case the contract would have to include a sequential rationality constraint ensuring
that the lender/monitor has the incentive to undertake the audit and also a truthtelling
constraint ensuring that there is su±cient auditing to prevent any cheating.
5.1. The Single Lender Truthtelling Case. To ensure truthtelling by the high
type of borrower requires RH ￿ mqRHL + (1 ¡ m + m(1 ¡ q))RL and to ensure that the
auditing will be undertaken we require RLL ¸ RL ¡ Á=q: The optimal contract problem
will then have the form: choose Rs;m to maximise
p[yH ¡ RH] + (1 ¡ p)[yL ¡ mqRLL ¡ (1 ¡ mq)RL]
subject to:
pRH + (1 ¡ p)[mqRLL + (1 ¡ mq)RL ¡ mÁ] ¸ (1 + r)BTruth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts27
RH ￿ mqRHL + (1 ¡ mq))RL (53)
RLL ¸ RL + Á=q (54)
Rs ￿ ys (55)
There must be maximum punishment, otherwise RHL could be increased which would
make both the lenders participation constraint and the truthtelling constraint more slack,
allowing a reduction in RH which would make the borrower better o®. Then given this the
truthtelling constraint must bind at the optimum, otherwise m could be reduced which
would reduce the expected observation costs and also make the lenders participation
constraint slacker. Thus the solution must have
l = 0;m = (RH ¡ RL)=(q(yH ¡ RL))
But these are identical to the Nash equilibrium values so that the optimal repayments in
the sequentially rational contract must coincide with the optimal repayments when au-
dit/cheating strategies are determined as a post-contract simultaneous Nash equilibrium.
5.2. The Two Lender Truthtelling Contract. The same considerations for ensur-
ing truthtelling and the incentive to audit apply here as in the single lender case so the
optimal contract problem has the form: choose Rs;Ps;m to maximise
p[yH ¡ RH ¡ PH] + (1 ¡ p)[yL ¡ mq(RLL + PLL) ¡ (1 ¡ mq)(RL + PL)]
subject to:
p(RH + PH) + (1 ¡ p)[mq(RLL + PLL) + (1 ¡ mq)(RL + PL) ¡ mÁ] ¸ (1 + r)BTruth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts28
RH + PH ￿ mq(RHL + PHL) + (1 ¡ mq)(RL + PL) (56)
RLL ¸ RL + Á=q (57)
PS + Rs ￿ ys;s = H;L;LL;HL (58)
The same arguments apply here. There must be maximum punishment, otherwise RHL+
PHL could be increased which would make at least one of the lenders participation con-
straint and the truthtelling constraint more slack, allowing a reduction in RH +PH which
would make the borrower better o®. Then given this the truthtelling constraint must
bind at the optimum, otherwise m could be reduced which would reduce the expected
observation costs and also make the lenders participation constraint slacker. Thus the
solution must have
l = 0;m = (RH + PH ¡ RL ¡ PL)=(yH ¡ RL ¡ PL)
But these are identical to the Nash equilibrium values so that the optimal repayments in
the sequentially rational contract must coincide with the optimal repayments when au-
dit/cheating strategies are determined as a post-contract simultaneous Nash equilibrium.
These results are interesting as they tell us that a "decentralised" solution in which
auditing is not written into the contract but is determined noncooperatively in a game
gives the same outcome as the "centralised" solution when auditing is determined within
a sequential rationality constraint.
6. The Optimal Choice of B
All the above is for the ¯xed ¯nance case where revenues are independent of the scale of
¯nance. When revenues vary with the level of ¯nance as under assumptions (A.2),
there are new questions and considerations. these are:
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-under what conditions will it be best to constrain the ¯nance level to ensure that a SRC
is possible which will avoid the incentive problems and costly state observation?
-allowing for choice of the optimal level of ¯nance within any given contract form, is
it still true that the two investor hybrid truthtelling contract dominates the other
forms?
-we have seen that with ¯nance-independent revenues, if investors have limited liabil-
ity and yL < Á=q neither of the hybrid contracts are feasible. But with ¯nance-
dependent revenues, the level of ¯nance could be constrained to ensure that yL(B) ¸
Á=q which generates the idea of a constrained one or two investor truthtelling con-
tract. Then we want to see how these constrained hybrid contracts compare in
welfare terms with a KP contract.
First we describe the detail of the SRC contract. Next since each contract requires
some restrictions on the range of B to ensure that monitoring and cheating probabilities
are in the unit interval and that participation constraints can hold, we de¯ne these ranges.
Here we show that each of the three main contract forms is feasible i® B > BSR while
the SRC contract is feasible i® B ￿ BSR: Then we consider comparisons of ¯nance levels
and welfare between the contract forms under unlimited liability, and ¯nally analyse the
limited liability case.
6.1. The SR Contract. When revenues vary with the level of ¯nance and (A.2) holds
it is possible that B is set so low that the subsequent Nash equilibrium is in pure strategies
l = 1;m = 0: We call this a SR contract since there is always a low report which results
in a single repayment of RL: In this case the contract problem has the form:
maxEsys ¡ RL (59)
RL ¸ (1 + r)B (60)Truth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts30
RL ￿ yL (61)
The ¯rst constraint must bind since otherwise RL could be reduced raising debtor expected
utility. Since ys(:) is increasing and concave, the solution for B in the SR contract will
be at BSR. We have to contrast this payo® with those arising from either a KP solution
or a H1;H2 solution in which l = 0.
6.2. Feasibility of the Contracts. The SR contract is feasible only for:
B ￿ BSR
Note that at BSR;EUKP = EUSR > EUH so long as EUKP is well de¯ned. And for
B > BSR; EUSR > EUKP again so long as EUKP is well de¯ned. We also know that by
assumption B1 > BSR:
The KP contract (65) is only valid for 0 < lKP < 1 (which requires B > BKP) and
0 < mKP < 1 (which requires B > BSR); where BKP is de¯ned by:
p[yH(BKP) ¡ yL(BKP)] = Á=q (62)
From the assumption about the e±ciency of the investment (A 2.5) we know that BKP <
BSR so that the KP contract is certainly feasible at or above BSR: In particular the
condition mKP < 1 can be expressed as:
(yH ¡ yL)[(1 + r)B ¡ pyH ¡ (1 ¡ p)yL + Á=q] < [(1 + r)B ¡ yL]Á=q (63)
This is always true at B ¸ BSR since from (A 2.5) the LHS is negative whist the RHS is
positive.
The H1 contract (47) is only well de¯ned when 0 < mH1 < 1; this requires (1 +
r)B ¡yL +Á=q > 0 and (1+r)B < yH: Generally there may exist two values of B;BHS1
and BHS2; at which (1 + r)B ¡ yL + Á=q = 0; i.e. such that for BHS2 < B < BHS1;
(1 + r)B + Á=q < yL although for su±ciently high Á there will be no solutions to this
equation. De¯ne Áh;Bh by (1 + r)Bh + Áh=q = yL(Bh);(1 + r) = y
0
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they both satisfy BHSi < BSR (i = 1;2): So the H1 contract is feasible at any B such
that:
B > BSR
From the form of (47) it follows that below BSR the SR contract dominates the H1
contract in regions where the latter is de¯ned. However, since we are concerned with
situations where the ¯rst best level of investment cannot be implemented by a SR contract,
our second best optima will be at or above BSR:
Finally, the H2 contract is feasible i® 0 < mH2 < 1; this requires B > BH2 where
BH2 satis¯es:
p[yH(BH2) ¡ yL(BH2)] = (1 ¡ p)Á=q (64)
as well as B > BSR: Note that these two conditions together are su±cient to ensure that,
in particular, mH2 < 1, i.e:
Esys ¡ (1 + r)B < (1 ¡ p)Á=q
Also BH2 < BKP < BSR so that the H2 contract is feasible at any B ¸ BSR:
We can summarise this discussion by noting that the two forms of hybrid truthtelling
contract and the KP contract are all well de¯ned i® B ¸ BSR:
6.3. The Unlimited Liability Case. Here with unlimited liability for each type of
contract form, H2;H1 or KP; the optimal loan size will maximise the respective value
function (48),(47) or (46) within the constraint B ¸ BSR: So long as EU
0
s(BSR) > 0 and
the value function is concave4, the constraint will not bind but in either unproductive
technologies or where the observaton cost is high, the optimum may be at BSR:
It is then easy to show that:
4Su±cient conditions for concavity which also guarantee EU
0
s(BSR) > 0 for each value function are
available on request. The simulations below do not respect these conditions but nevertheless the simulated
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Proposition 3. With unlimited liability the superiority of the two investors truthtelling
contract over the other two forms of contract carries over into the scenario in which the
loan size is endogenous.
The reason is that each of the three contract forms is feasible at any ¯nance level at
or above BSR. Hence it follows that the H2 contract is feasible at the optimal ¯nance
levels of the H1 and KP contracts. From Proposition 2, ¯xing the level of ¯nance at
respectively the optimal level of the H1 or KP contracts, these contracts are worse than
H2: Hence a fortiori these contracts are worse than the H2 contract at its optimal level
of ¯nance.
However it is still possible that the optimal single repayment contract which is at
BSR dominates the optimal two investor truthtelling contract. We might expect this to
be the case if either the observation cost is su±ciently high or the technology relatively
unproductive, so that the ¯rst best investment level is only marginally above BSR. Since
global properties of the technology are involved, in each case an explicit comparison has
to be made between these two contracts.
The two investor truthtelling contract (48) has expected utility of identical form to
the compulsory monitoring (second best) contract (6)-(9); so they both have the same
optimal investment level. We also know that BSR is below the optimal investment level
of each contract.
There is a question about the optimal level of ¯nance compared with the (unattainable)
¯rst best. In fact we can show that all the contracts have under¯nance relative to the
¯rst best. Thus we have:
Proposition 4. With unlimited liability all the contracts SRC, KP and the two hybrid
truthtelling contracts have under¯nance compared with the ¯rst best if each value function
is strictly concave. The optimal ¯nance level in the two investor hybrid coincides with
that of the compulsory monitoring second best; the SRC contract has less ¯nance thanTruth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts33
the second best.
The comparisons between the optimal ¯nance level in the KP and the two investor
truthtelling contracts are unclear. For example if we use functions ys = as
p
B then if
aL = 1;r = 0:04 and p = 0:05 (which yield BSR = 0:924) then for varying aH and Á we






1 4:0 0:924 0:924 1:442 1:442
1 5:0 1:68 1:608 2:000 2:033
1 7:0 3:37 3:356 3:653 3:671
2 7:0 2:983 3:023 3:374 3:477
3 7:0 2:866 2:65 2:862 3:255
6.4. The Limited Liability Case. Under limited liability all repayments must be
nonnegative. This means that in either the one or two investor truthtelling contracts we
need yL(B) ¸ RLL ¸ RL + Á=q: Since RL ¸ 0 this means a truthtelling contract with
limited liability is feasible only for values of B such that yL(B) ¸ Á=q: De¯ne BL by the
equation yL(B) = Á=q:
The problems with limited liability arise only if B¤
H2 < BL: If B¤
H2 > BL we can
use the unlimited liability argument to show that the H2 contract dominates the KP




H1 < BL then both limited liability truthtelling contracts have their opti-
mal investment levels at BL and so EUH1(BL) < EUH2(BL): On the other hand the
comparison between the H2 and the KP contract is ambiguous .
If B¤
H1 > BL > B¤
H2 then the optimal limited and unlimited liability H1 contracts
coincide whereas the optimal limited liability H2 contract is at BL: Again here the com-
parison between the constrained ¯nance H2 contract and either of the unconstrained
¯nance H1;KP contracts is ambiguous.
Proposition 5. With limited liability if BL > B¤
H1;B¤
H2 the two investor truthtelling
contract dominates the single investor truthtelling contract and may still be better than
the KP contract. Moreover the two truthtelling contracts have the same investment levelTruth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts34
BL: If B¤
H1 > BL > B¤
H2 the two investor truthtelling contract may dominate the KP and
the single investor hybrid truthtelling contract. If BL < B¤
H2 the limited and unlimited
liability contracts have the same investment level in each contract form and so the two
investor hybrid truthtelling contract dominates the alternatives.
To see the relation between the contracts under limited liability we have simulated




B;p = 0:5;r = 0:04: This gives








1:6 2:56 3:164 3:132 3:406 3:558¤ 3:525 3:424 3:501
1:7 2:89 3:129 3:095 3:399 3:538¤ 3:533 3:388 3:471
1:8 3:24 3:094 3:057 3:393 3:518 3:516¤ 3:351 3:441
1:9 3:61 3:059 3:020 3:388 3:498 3:475¤ 3:313 3:408
In the ¯rst two rows all unlimited liability ¯nance levels are above BL and so the
limited liability constraint does not bind and the two investor hybrid is optimal. In the
third row B¤
H2 < BL < B¤
H1 so the limited liability constraint binds only for H2 contract.
Nevertheless the constrained H2 with ¯nance equal to BL still dominates the other two
unlimited liability, unconstrained optima. Finally in the last row B¤
H2;B¤
H1 < BL so the
limited liability constraint binds for both the truthtelling contracts, hence the H2 contract
is better than the H1 contract and also again in the example the constrained H2 contract
dominates the KP contract. The example satis¯es the technical assumptions (A.2), other
features of interest are that always B¤
H1 involves the highest ¯nance level and although
not shown here, theH2 contract has lower monitporing than the other two contracts5.
7. Extensions
Persons includes a uniform per capita cost on investors of actually writing the contract:
he assumes that each lender faces an initial ¯xed cost just of writing the contract so that,
for example, a contract with three parties is 50% more costly to write than a contract
with two. Given this, he shows that for di®erent required investment levels and contract
writing costs, any of the H1;H2 or KP contract forms can be optimal. Generally as
5These seem to be general features in the simulations which we conjecture to be anlytically true.Truth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts35
the required investment level rises, the optimal contract switches from the KP form to a
two investor truthtelling contract and then ¯nally for high required investment to a single
investor truthtelling contract. On the other hand we have shown that if the ¯xed cost on
each party of writing the contract is zero, a truthtelling contract with two investors, H2,
always dominates the two other contract forms, H1 and KP, under unlimited liability
even if the ¯nance level is endogenous and also with limited liability if the ¯xed ¯nance
requirement generates high enough low state revenues.
Suppose that we generalise Persons contract writing costs by assuming that the bor-
rower faces a ¯xed cost of f0 to write the contract whilst the lender/monitor faces a cost
of f1 and the passive investor faces a contract writing cost of f2: f0 is immaterial since
essentially in all the analysis it just amounts to subtracting f0 from the revenues of each
state-we can reinterpret all of our assumptions and results in terms of revenues net of f0:
Similarly if f2 = 0 then the role of f1 is solely to raise the fair return of investors from
(1+r)B to (1+r)B +f1 and since every contract has at least the monitoring investor, it
makes no di®erence to the comparison of the merits of the di®erent contracts6. However
the presence of f2 does make a potential di®erence: It puts the two investor truthtelling
contract at a relative disadvantage, and if it is su±ciently high we lose the result that the
H2 contract is always preferable. Skipping over the details of the repayments, the value
functions of the borrower in each contract form with contract writing costs become
EUKP(B) = EUSR(B) ¡
(1 ¡ p)(Á=q)[(1 + r)B +
P1
i=0 fi ¡ yL]
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ Á=q
(65)
EUH1(B) = EUSR(B) ¡
(1 ¡ p)(Á=q)[(1 + r)B +
P1
i=0 fi ¡ yL + Á=q]
p(yH ¡ yL + Á=q)
(66)
EUH2(B) = EUSR(B) ¡
(1 ¡ p)(Á=q)[(1 + r)B +
P2
i=0 fi ¡ yL]
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q
(67)
6One further di®erence is in the de¯nition of BSR : now it is de¯ned by yL(BSR)¡f0 = (1+r)BSR +
f1 + f2
Even if f2 = 0 it may be that there are no roots to this equation in which case the SRC contract is not
feasible at any loan size; or there may be two roots, in which case we use the higher root in our analysis.Truth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts36
and the comparisons between contracts for a ¯xed investment size become
EUH1 ¡ EUH2 =
p(yH ¡ yL)f2
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)(Á=q)
¡
(Á=q)2(1 ¡ p)(Ey ¡ (1 + r)B ¡ f1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q)
(p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)(Á=q))p(yH ¡ yL + Á=q)
(68)
and
EUH2 ¡ EUKP =
(Á=q)(1 ¡ p)
h
(1 + r)B +
P1
i=0 fi ¡ yL
i
p(Á=q)
[p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ Á=q][p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q]
¡
(1 ¡ p)(Á=q)f2
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q
(69)
So if f2 is high enough, the H2 contract may no longer dominate. However there are
reasons for taking f2 to be relatively small. It represents the additional contract writing
cost of adding a passive lender to a two party contract with an auditing lender. First if
contract writing costs are per contract and not per party then we can set f1 = f2 = 0;
if the additional costs of an extra party amount to just photocopying the contract terms
that seems reasonable. Second one can argue that the arrangements that the auditing
lender has to make in preparing the contract (e.g. providing a mechanism for an audit
and public announcement of the result of an audit) are likely to be quite a lot higher than
the costs of the passive lender. Under these circumstances the H2 contract will continue
to dominate.
We have shown that there are bene¯ts to sharing ¯nance essentially on liquidity and
incentive grounds when the borrower has limited liability-the second lender can be used
to cover the observation costs of the monitor, keeping down the incentive of the borrower
to cheat. Another reason for sharing the provision of ¯nance obviously arises if lenders
are risk averse.
Generally the literature argues that stopping the spread of information to uninformed
parties (here lenders) will assist in ensuring renegotiation-proofness (Hart & Tirole (1988),
Dewatripoint (1989), Fudenberg & Tirole (1990), Krasa & Villamil (2000).
All the contracts considered here optimally involve some costly monitoring, implicitly
there is an incentive for the parties to the contract to eliminate this cost by renegotiationTruth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts37
at the interim stage. Given that the audit and reporting strategies are determined in
a simultaneous noncooperative game, any renegotiation must occur after the borrower
knows their type but before the game is played. We will assume that it is the monitoring
lender who makes an o®er7 In general from the original contract the high type expects
UH = yH ¡ (1 ¡ l)RH ¡ l(mRHL + (1 ¡ m)RL) (70)
the low type expects
UL = yL ¡ (mRLL + (1 ¡ m)RL) (71)
and the lender expects
E¦ = p(1 ¡ l)RH + (1 ¡ p + pl)(m(RLL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ m)RL) (72)
First consider the H1 contract. Suppose the lender makes an o®er m0 = 0 in exchange
for a payment from the borrower of e; if it is accepted, then e is paid, there is no report
and no audit: his is similar to an out of court settlement. The low type accepts if (mRLL+
(1¡m)RL) > e while the high type accepts if (1¡l)RH¡l(mRHL+(1¡m)RL) > e where
l;m have their H1 NE values with repayments of the original contract. In H1 contract
UH = yH ¡ RH (73)
UL = yL ¡ (mRLL + (1 ¡ m)RL) (74)
E¦ = pRH + (1 ¡ p)(m(RLL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ m)RL) (75)
So with the hybrid we would need RH > e for the high type to accept; mRLL+(1¡m)RL >
e for the low type to accept and e > pRH + (1 ¡ p)(m(RLL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ m)RL) for the
7This is the simpler scenario since we do not have to worry about the information that is transmitted
by the o®er to the uninformed lenders if the o®er is made by the borrower. However our main result on
renegotiation-proofness of the contracts extends to this case. For simplicity here we also assume q = 1:Truth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts38
lender to o®er. Using the hybrid condition RLL¡Á = RL; these inequalities are mutually
inconsistent:
yL ¡ (1 ¡ m)Á = mRLL + (1 ¡ m)RL > e (76)
> pRH + (1 ¡ p)(m(RLL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ m)RL) (77)
= pRH + (1 ¡ p)(yL ¡ Á) (78)
or mÁ > p(RH ¡ yL + Á): Using the expression for m this gives (1 ¡ p)Á > p(yH ¡ yL)
which is false. Similarly we cannot ¯nd an o®er e that only the low type will accept
and that the lender will make, knowing that only the low type will accept (this would
require e < RH;mRLL + (1 ¡ m)RL > e and e > (m(RLL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ m)RL): In part
because RH > yL ¸ RLL;RL). We can have o®ers that only the high type will accept:
RH > e > mRLL +(1¡m)RL but e > pRH +(1¡p)(m(RLL ¡Á)+(1¡m)RL) but then
the lender knows that with a rejected o®er he will be facing a low type in the game and
hence will not wish to monitor. The expected gain to the lender from making an o®er
that only the high type accepts is then pe + (1 ¡ p)RL (ie either the o®er is accepted or
since the lender learns that the type is low if the o®er is rejected, the borrower reports
low and there is no monitoring). It will be worth the lender doing this is if
pRH + (1 ¡ p)RL > (79)
pe + (1 ¡ p)RL > pRH + (1 ¡ p)(m(RLL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ m)RL) (80)
which reduces to
RL > RLL ¡ Á (81)
which contradicts having hybrid repayments.
Now consider the KP contract: here the H type will accept if
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and the L type will accept if
mRLL + (1 ¡ m)RL > e (83)
whilst o®ers will be made if
e > p(1 ¡ l)RH + mpl(RHL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ p)m(RLL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ p + pl)(1 ¡ m)RL) (84)
Combining these with the indi®erence condition of the monitor in mixed strategy plRHL+
(1 ¡ p)RLL ¡ Á = (1 ¡ p + pl)RL) again no acceptable o®er is possible: it would need
yL = mRLL + (1 ¡ m)RL > (85)
e > p(1 ¡ l)RH + mpl(RHL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ p)m(RLL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ p + pl)(1 ¡ m)RL) (86)
= p(1 ¡ l)RH + (1 ¡ p + pl)RL > RL = yL (87)
With the truthtelling H2 contract the o®er by the lender takes the form of m0 = 0 in
exchange for a repayment to the monitor of e and a repayment to the pure investor of P0:
The pure investor expects to get
pPH + (1 ¡ p)[mPLL + (1 ¡ m)PL] (88)
Hence any o®er must satisfy
P0 > pPH + (1 ¡ p)[mPLL + (1 ¡ m)PL] (89)
as well as the conditions RH +PH > e+P0 for the high type to accept; m(RLL +PLL)+
(1 ¡ m)(RL + PL) > e + P0 for the low type to accept and e > pRH + (1 ¡ p)(m(RLL ¡
Á) + (1 ¡ m)RL) for the monitoring lender to accept.
We can then mimic the H1 argument: there is no o®er that is acceptable by both
types of borrower and the pure lender: it would need
yL = m(RLL + PLL) + (1 ¡ m)(RL + PL) > e + P0 (90)
> p(RH + PH) + (1 ¡ p)(m(RLL + PLL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ m)(RL + PL)) (91)
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or 0 > p(RH +PH ¡yL)¡(1¡p)mÁ: Using the expression for m this gives 0 > m[p(yH ¡
yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á] which is a contradiction.
Hence all three contracts are renegotiation proof if the o®er is made by the lender after
the borrower knows their type but before the game8.
In contrast to this Persons ¯nds that H1 and H2 are renegotiable but his timing is
di®erent. If monitoring is written into the contract together with a sequential rationality
constraint and a truthtelling constraint, then renegotiation can occur after the borrower
knows his type and has made his report but before the monitoring has been implemented.
In this context both Persons and Krasa and Villamil argue that a truthtelling contract
with random monitoring is renegotiable: since the contract has truthtelling and random
monitoring the indi®erence condition of the lender states that RLL = RL + Á and so
following a low report, the lender will get RL for sure. If the borrower o®ers a reduction
in RLL the lender will revise m to zero but will still get RL for sure. This saving in
monitoring costs reduces the borrowers repayments so the o®er will be made, and accepted
by the indi®erent lender. However this argument has the weakness that the high type of
borrower can argue that they know the low type will make this report and acceptable o®er
in which case they too should cheat, report low and make the same o®er. The rational
lender would realise this and hence should argue that there is a chance p that they will
get RHL after the low report and o®er. Hence they should refuse the o®er.
8. Conclusions
In a costly state veri¯cation framework for loan contracts without commitment we con-
sider the result of Persons (1996) that there may be alternative forms of optimal contract
that involve various degrees of misrepresentation. Whilst taking a formal postcontract
game theoretic approach we also specialise his environment to cases where there is no
independent ¯xed cost to writing a contract. We then compare the following forms of
contract: ¯rstly, a contract involving randomised cheating and randomised monitoring.
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This is an interior mixed strategy type contract that coincides with Persons' "misrepre-
sentation" contract and has subsequently also been examined by Khalil and Parigi (1998);
hence we call it the KP contract form. Secondly, a contract that involves a pooling type
of solution in which investment and the loan size are su±ciently reduced to make a single
non-contingent repayment a feasible means of repaying the loan: we call this the sin-
gle repayment contract or SR form. And, thirdly, the contract may involve truthtelling
and randomised monitoring as natural Nash equilibrium outcomes; these two contracts
coincide with Persons' "truthtelling" contracts and because they merge truthtelling with
random monitoring we call them hybrid contracts, H1 and H2 respectively. Persons shows
that if the loan size is ¯xed each of the KP;H1 and H2 forms can be optimal, under given
feasibility conditions. We show that if the loan size is ¯xed the H2 form always dominates
the other two if there is unlimited liability and if there is limited liability but the ¯xed
size of the loan is such that the low state income is still greater than the observation cost;
otherwise the KP form will be optimal. If the loan size is optimally chosen and there is
unlimited liability again the H2 form dominates the other two. On the other hand, again
if there is limited liability under certain conditions either a KP form or a constrained H2
form may be optimal.
We see di®erent loan circumstances, perhaps most often consumer loans have a single
lender whilst entrepreneurial loans come from multiple lenders. The theory in this paper
says that when there is unlimited liability or when the observation costs are small relative
to the low state revenues then we can expect to observe two lenders and that the reason
for this is essentially that the passive investor ¯nances the monitoring costs of the active
investor, which improves incentives for truthtelling by the borrower. The existence of the
two investor hybrid contract is important since despite the noncooperative no commitment
scenario, it implements the commitment solution. This may no longer be possible under
limited liability, which means repayments in the lowest state must be positive so that for
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in accordance with Persons' argument that management misrepresentation may induce
Pareto improvements when monitoring is not contractible, although it limits this argument
to a very speci¯c set of circumstances that must occur in the face of an optimally chosen
loan size.
On the other hand, one might argue that consumer loans typically have high observa-
tion costs compared to entrepreneurial loans where there are legal standards for reporting.
It is also arguable that worse things can happen to consumers than to entrepreneurs so
that in bad states there is less pro¯t to ¯ght over and to ¯nance audit. In fact the recovery
rate on debt in personal bankruptcy after audit costs have been paid is very low in the
UK.
In this paper we have shown that a simpli¯cation of the Persons framework allows us to
get much stronger results about the relative superiority of di®erent ¯nancing arrangements
in asymmetric information contexts. Limited liability is important as is the size of low
state revenues in relation to audit costs. Generally with unlimited liability or in situations
where the observation cost is low relative to low state revenues in our framework it is better
to have two investors rather than one.
A. Appendix
A.1. The Second Period Game Forms. For each possible game form we ¯nd the
restrictions on repayments supporting that Nash equilibrium and show that when the
lender is on their reservation level (E¼ = 0) the debtor payo® is the di®erence between
Esys ¡ (1 + r)B; s = H;L; and the expected observation cost.
Pure Strategy Second Period Equilibria.
(i) l = m = 0. This requires @E¼=@mj(l = 0) = q(RLL ¡ RL ¡ Á=q) < 0 and
@EU=@lj(m = 0) = p(RH ¡ RL) < 0 to be a Nash equilibrium. Of course The expected
observation cost with this game outcome is zero. However it is of no interest since it gives
incentives to cheat in the realised low income state.
(ii) l = 0;m = 1. This requires @E¼=@mj(l = 0) = (1 ¡ p)q(RLL ¡ RL ¡ Á=q) > 0
and @EU=@lj(m = 1) = p(RH ¡ qRHL ¡ (1 ¡ q)RL) < 0 to be a Nash equilibrium. This
is clearly very ine±cient; the lender knows that there is no lying but can make money by
monitoring so observation costs are always paid. E®ectively the state with no monitoring
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(iii) l = m = 1. This requires @E¼=@mj(l = 1) = q(pRHL+(1¡p)RLL¡RL¡Á=q) >
0 and @EU=@lj(m = 1) = p(RH ¡qRHL¡(1¡q)RL) > 0 to be a Nash equilibrium. Again
this is very ine±cient: since RH < qRHL + (1 ¡ q)RL the borrower has an incentive to
always cheat; but on average the lender will gain by monitoring every low income report.
Again there are e®ectively two states in the second period: the high income state with a
false low income report which is monitored and punishment is paid and the low income
state which is truthfully reported but always monitored. The expected observation cost
is Á:
(iv) l = 1;m = 0. This requires @E¼=@mj(l = 1) = q(pRHL + (1 ¡ p)RLL ¡ RL ¡
Á=q) < 0 and @EU=@lj(m = 0) = p(RH¡RL) > 0 to be a Nash equilibrium. The borrower
has an incentive to cheat but Á is too high for the lender to monitor. Whenever l = 1 we
have a pooling equilibrium with identical repayment o®ers RL from both types of debtor.
The expected observation cost is zero.
Note that if Á is high enough the (present) pooling equilibrium form with l = 1;m = 0
dominates the ¯rst (and all the other) pure strategy equilibria.
Hybrid Equilibria. The second period game may have equilibria in which only one
party plays a pure strategy and the other party randomises. This requires the randomis-
ing party to be indi®erent between di®erent values of her choice probability whilst the
deterministic party must strictly prefer the corner.
(i) m = 0;0 < l < 1. This requires @E¼=@mj(l =
(1¡p)(RL¡RLL+Á=q)
p(RHL¡RL¡Á=q) ) < 0 and
@EU=@lj(m = 0) = p(RH ¡RL) = 0: Taken together these yield RH = RL and any value
of l satisfying 0 < l <
(1¡p)(RL¡RLL+Á=q)
p(RHL¡RL¡Á=q) < 1 will su±ce. The expected observation cost
is zero.
(ii) m = 1;0 < l < 1. This requires @E¼=@mj(l =
(1¡p)(RL¡RLL+Á=q)
p(RHL¡RL¡Á=q) ) > 0 and
@EU=@lj(m = 1) = p(RH ¡ qRHL ¡ (1 ¡ q)RL) = 0: Taken together these yield RH =
qRHL+(1¡q)RL and any value of l satisfying 1 > l >
(1¡p)(RL¡RLL+Á=q)
p(RHL¡RL¡Á=q) > 0 will su±ce.
The expected observation cost is (1 ¡ p + pl)Á:
(iii) l = 0;0 < m < 1. This requires @E¼=@mj(l = 0) = (1¡p)q(RLL¡RL¡Á=q) = 0
and EU=@lj(m = RH¡RL
q(RHL¡RL)) < 0: Taken together these yield RLL = RL + Á=q and any
value of m satisfying 0 < m < RH¡RL
q(RHL¡RL) < 1 will su±ce. The expected observation cost
is (1 ¡ p)mÁ.
(iv) l = 1;0 < m < 1. This requires @E¼=@mj(l = 1) = q(pRHL + (1 ¡ p)RLL ¡
RL¡Á=q) = 0 and EU=@lj(m = RH¡RL
q(RHL¡RL)) > 0: Taken together these yield pRHL+(1¡
p)RLL = RL + Á=q and any value of m satisfying 1 > m > RH¡RL
q(RHL¡RL) > 0 will su±ce.
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Interior Mixed Strategy Equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies
requires:
@EU=@l = 0 = ¡p(yH ¡ RH) + p[m(yH ¡ qRHL ¡ (1 ¡ q)RL) + (1 ¡ m)(yH ¡ RL)]
@E¼=@m = 0 = plq(RHL ¡ RL ¡ Á=q) + (1 ¡ p)q(RLL ¡ RL ¡ Á=q)





(1 ¡ p)(RL ¡ RLL + Á=q)
p(RHL ¡ RL ¡ Á=q)
For an interior intersection of the reaction curves, the above imply:
q(RHL ¡ RL) > RH ¡ RL > 0 to give 0 < m < 1 and either:
(A): RL¡RLL+Á=q > 0 RHL¡RL¡Á=q > 0 pRHL+(1¡p)RLL¡RL¡Á=q > 0
or:
(B): RL¡RLL+Á=q < 0 RHL¡RL¡Á=q < 0 pRHL+(1¡p)RLL¡RL¡Á=q < 0
to give 0 < l < 1
However, to rule out the case l = 0;m = 1 we must be in (A): The expected observation
costs are (1 ¡ p + pl)mÁ:
Dominance Relations between Game Forms. Since yL < (1 + r)B , the con-
tracts leading to the pure strategy (l = 1;m = 0) or to the hybrid form (m = 0;0 < l < 1)
are infeasible since the single repayment RL does not cover (1 + r)B.
Since the optimal contract will always hold the lender to his reservation level of zero,
we can Pareto rank the contracts by the expected borrower's payo®. This amounts to
ranking by the expected observation cost:
² the hybrid case l = 0;0 < m < 1 dominates the pure strategy case l = 0;m = 1
because it has lower observation cost; in turn the latter dominates the hybrid case
m = 1;0 < l < 1;
² the hybrid case l = 0;0 < m < 1 also dominates the hybrid case l = 1;0 < m < 1
for the same reasons;
² the pure strategy case l = m = 1 is dominated by l = 0;m = 1:
So there are two possible candidates for an optimal contract-game form: the hybrid
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Now suppose that B is variable: under our technological assumptions whilst the ¯rst
best cannot be implemented, nevertheless, either the hybrid form m = 0;0 < l < 1 or the
pure strategy case m = 0;l = 1 can be made feasible by reducing B to the level satisfying
yL(B) = (1 + r)B and are then indi®erent to each other.
Take any other pair of H or pure strategy cases; at any ¯xed level of B we know the
above rankings hold. So for example EfU(B)jl = 0;0 < m < 1g > EfU(B)jl = 0;m = 1g
for any B: Letting B01 = argmaxEfU(B)jl = 0;m = 1g; it follows that:
max
B
EfU(B)jl = 0;0 < m < 1g ¸ EfU(B01)jl = 0;0 < m < 1g
> EfU(B01)jl = 0;m = 1g
A.2. The Optimal Repayments Conditional on the Interior Mixed Strategy
Solution. The borrower's payo® is:
EU = p(1 ¡ l)(yH ¡ RH) + pl[m(q(yH ¡ RHL) + (1 ¡ q)(yH ¡ RL)) + (1 ¡ m)(yH ¡ RL)]
+ (1 ¡ p)[m(q(yL ¡ RLL) + (1 ¡ q)(yL ¡ RL)) + (1 ¡ m)(yL ¡ RL)]
= p(1 ¡ l)(yH ¡ RH) + pl[m(yH ¡ qRHL ¡ (1 ¡ q)RL) + (1 ¡ m)(yH ¡ RL)]
+ (1 ¡ p)[m(yL ¡ qRLL ¡ (1 ¡ q)RL) + (1 ¡ m)(yL ¡ RL)]
and there is only one lender whose payo® is:
E¼ = p(1 ¡ l)RH + pl[m(q(RHL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ q)(RL ¡ Á)) + (1 ¡ m)RL]
+(1 ¡ p)[m(q(RLL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ q)(RL ¡ Á)) + (1 ¡ m)RL] ¡ (1 + r)B
= p(1 ¡ l)RH + pl[m(qRHL + (1 ¡ q)RL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ m)RL]
+(1 ¡ p)[m(qRLL + (1 ¡ q)RL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ m)RL] ¡ (1 + r)B
= pRH + (1 ¡ p)RL ¡ pl(RH ¡ RL) + plmq(RHL ¡ RL ¡ Á=q)
+(1 ¡ p)mq(RLL ¡ RL ¡ Á=q) ¡ (1 + r)B
The Nash equilibrium values of the probabilities of monitoring and lying are given by the
reaction functions:
@EU=@l = 0 = ¡p(yH ¡ RH) + p[m(yH ¡ qRHL ¡ (1 ¡ q)RL) + (1 ¡ m)(yH ¡ RL)]
@E¼=@m = 0 = plq(RHL ¡ RL ¡ Á=q) ¡ (1 ¡ p)q(RLL ¡ RL ¡ Á=q)Truth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts46





(1 ¡ p)(RL ¡ RLL + Á=q)
p(RHL ¡ RL ¡ Á=q)
There is zero borrower surplus in the low state:
RLL = RL = yL
and there is maximum punishment when caught cheating in the high state:
RHL = yH







p(yH ¡ yL ¡ Á=q)
We can then substitute the above values of the probabilities and of the repayments into
the lenders participation constraint E¼ = 0 to ¯nd:
E¼ = 0 = pRH + (1 ¡ p)RL ¡ (1 ¡ p)(RH ¡ yL)(
Á=q
yH ¡ yL ¡ Á=q
) ¡ (1 + r)B
Solving for the repayment in the high state RH then gives:
RH =
(1 + r)B(yH ¡ yL ¡ Á=q) ¡ (1 ¡ p)yL(yH ¡ yL)
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ Á=q
and:
m =
[(1 + r)B ¡ yL](yH ¡ yL ¡ Á=q)
[p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ Á=q](yH ¡ yL)
Finally substituting all values of the repayments and of the probabilities of monitoring
and lying gives the borrower's expected utility:
EU = Esys ¡ (1 + r)B ¡ pqlm(yH ¡ yL) = EUSR ¡ (1 ¡ p)(Á=q)[
(1 + r)B ¡ yL
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ Á=q
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A.3. The Optimal Repayments Conditional on the One Investor Hybrid So-
lution. When l = 0 the borrower and lender's payo®s become:
EU = p(yH ¡ RH) + (1 ¡ p)[yL ¡ m(qRLL + (1 ¡ q)RL) ¡ (1 ¡ m)RL]
= p(yH ¡ RH) + (1 ¡ p)[yL ¡ mqRLL + (1 ¡ mq)RL]
and:
E¼ = E¼1 + E¼2
= pRH + (1 ¡ p)[m(q(RLL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ q)(RL ¡ Á)) + (1 ¡ m)RL] ¡ (1 + r)B
= pRH + (1 ¡ p)[mqRLL + (1 ¡ mq)RL ¡ mÁ] ¡ (1 + r)B
respectively. The truthtelling constraint is:
RH = m[qRHL + (1 ¡ q)RL] + (1 ¡ m)RL = mqRHL + (1 ¡ mq)RL
There is zero borrower surplus when monitored in the low state:
RLL = RL + Á=q = yL
Hence:
RL = yL ¡ Á=q
There is maximum punishment when caught cheating in the high state:
RHL = yH
These two conditions imply that the truthtelling constraint becomes:
RH = mqyH + (1 ¡ mq)(yL ¡ Á=q)
Then substituting these values for the repayments into the lenders participation con-
straint E¼ = 0 we solve for the probability of monitoring:
m =
(1 + r)B ¡ yL + Á=q
qp(yH ¡ yL + Á=q)
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RH = yL ¡ Á=q + [
(1 + r)B ¡ yL + Á=q
p(yH ¡ yL + Á=q)
](yH ¡ yL + Á=q)
= [
(1 + r)B ¡ yL + Á=q
p(yH ¡ yL + Á=q)
]yH + [
Esys ¡ (1 + r)B ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q
p(yH ¡ yL + Á=q
](yL ¡ Á=q)
note that RHL > RH > RLL > RL
We then substitute again all the repayment values and probability of monitoring into
the borrowers expected utility EU to get:
EU = Esys ¡ (1 + r)B ¡ (1 ¡ p)Ám = EUSR ¡ (1 ¡ p)(Á=q)[
(1 + r)B ¡ yL + Á=q
p(yH ¡ yL + Á=q)
]
A.4. The Optimal Repayments Conditional on Two Investor Hybrid Solu-
tion. When l = 0 the borrower and lenders payo®s become:
EU = p[yH ¡ (RH + PH)] + (1 ¡ p)[yL ¡ m(q(RLL + PLL) + (1 ¡ q)(RL + PL)) ¡ (1 ¡ m)(RL + PL)]
= p[yH ¡ (RH + PH)] + (1 ¡ p)[yL ¡ mq(RLL + PLL) + (1 ¡ mq)(RL + PL)]
and:
E¼ = E¼1 + E¼2
= p(RH + PH) + (1 ¡ p)[m(q(RLL + PLL ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ q)(RL + PL ¡ Á)) + (1 ¡ m)(RL + PL)] ¡ (1 +
= p(RH + PH) + (1 ¡ p)[mq(RLL + PLL) + (1 ¡ mq)(RL + PL) ¡ mÁ] ¡ (1 + r)B
respectively. The truthtelling constraint is:
RH + PH = m[q(RHL + PHL) + (1 ¡ q)(RL + PL)] + (1 ¡ m)(RL + PL)
= mq(RHL + PHL) + (1 ¡ mq)(RL + PL)
There is zero borrower surplus when monitored in the low state:
RLL + PLL = RL + Á=q + PL ¡ Á=q = yL
Hence:
RL + PL = yL
There is maximum punishment when caught cheating in the high state:
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These two conditions imply that the truthtelling constraint becomes:
RH + PH = mqyH + (1 ¡ mq)yL
Then substituting these values for the repayments into the lenders participation con-
straint E¼ = 0 we solve for the probability of monitoring:
m =
(1 + r)B ¡ yL
q(p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q)
which in turn gives the repayments in the high state:
RH + PH = yL + [
(1 + r)B ¡ yL
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q
](yH ¡ yL)
= [
(1 + r)B ¡ yL
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q
]yH + [
Esys ¡ (1 + r)B
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q
]yL
Note that RHL + PHL > RH + PH > RLL + PLL = RL + PL:
We then substitute again all the repayment values and probability of monitoring into
the borrowers expected utility EU to get:
EU = Esys ¡ (1 + r)B ¡ (1 ¡ p)Ám = EUSR ¡ (1 ¡ p)(Á=q)[
(1 + r)B ¡ yL
p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ (1 ¡ p)Á=q
]
A.5. Unlimited Liability Optimal Contract. Proof. In each contract form
the optimal investment is at or above BSR. It follows that the H2 contract is feasible at
the optimal investment levels of the KP and H1 contracts, B¤
KP and B¤
H1 respectively.








A.6. Optimal Investment Levels of H1;H2;KP Are Below the First Best.







(1 ¡ p)Á(1 + r ¡ y
0
L]
p2(yH ¡ yL + Á)2 [(1 + r)B ¡ pyH ¡ (1 ¡ p)yL + Á(1 ¡ p)]
which under the feasibility condition is negative.




¡[(1 + r) ¡ y
0




L)[(1 + r)B1 ¡ yL]
[p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ Á]2
=
¡[(1 + r) ¡ y
0
L]fEy ¡ Á] ¡ (1 + r)B1g
[p(yH ¡ yL) ¡ Á]2 < 0




L) = (1 + r) ¡ y
0
L > 0 and the feasibility
condition which gives the sign.Truth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts50
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